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The Strict Scrutiny of Black and  
BlaQueer Life 
 
by T. ANANSI WILSON1* 
 
Introduction and Reframe 
 
This article builds upon the foundation laid in Furtive Blackness: On 
Blackness and Being and is a direct continuation of that project.  I want to 
re-posit furtivity as not merely a subject status but also an interiority and a 
practice of looking back, a practice of suspicion—a knowing to be suspicious 
of police, law and white people—and how to be ready and prepared to evade 
and bend and blend and make the right noise or silence.  Furtivity then, is the 
strategic embrace of both fungibility and individuality and the ocular 
anticipation of how one is being seen and unseen.  This is the strict scrutiny 
of Black life: it is simultaneously the strict scrutinization of self—in order to 
anticipate the fact of surveillance and discipline or reward—but also the 
interpersonal and structural strict scrutiny that provides the formal logic for 
quotidian contacts and violences by the state and citizens who claim the right 
to operate “under the cover of law” on its behalf (George Zimmerman, BBQ 
Becky, etc). 
If furtivity describes the conditions of Black life, then strict scrutiny 
marks the level of review, in and outside the auspices of law, in and outside 
of Black bodies.  In thinking about “Furtive Blackness” as a predicament, an 
imposition and an instance of Black reimagination and way-making, I want 
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to also think about the rigidity of the process of review.  Black people do not 
have standing—in court or commons—to define the scope of review nor its 
level of inquiry.  Much like Margaret Morgan, discussed in the previous 
article reviewing the Fugitive Slave Law (and Act), Black people—and 
Blackness itself—goes unrecognized as possessing a subject position of 
citizenship; thereby, dispossessed and subordinated in the workings of law 
practice, both in court and commons. 
Black people live under the conditions of strict scrutiny.  This is to say 
that Black people are always under the highest level of review, being looked 
at—and imagined—again and again, strictly.  In this instance, I’m not 
speaking of the Court’s usage of strict scrutiny but instead interrogating legal 
language to reveal and turn this logic on its head.  We live our lives on a 
razor’s edge: standing on a blade that cuts us when being still, when moving, 
when at work, when styling our hair, when covering our bodies, when 
expressing our joy or registering our pain.  Though there are formal limits 
on this review, particularly in Fourth Amendment law, they provide little 
material protection—generally only on police and formally sanctioned state 
actors—and often function as logics for quotidian contact and invasions of 
Black privacy and bodily autonomy. 
 
I. A Riff on Strict Scrutiny, From Protection to Prison 
 
In articulating “the strict scrutiny of Black life” I am again placing 
myself in conversation with Devon Carbado.  Carbado was speaking on a 
panel with Imani Perry, Kimberle Crenshaw and Mari Matsudah, celebrating 
the 25th anniversary of “intersectionality.”  To reground Kimberle 
Crenshaw’s concept of “intersectionality” within law, Marxism, materiality, 
critical legal studies, and especially critical race studies, Carbado began to 
riff on what he roughly titled “the strict scrutiny of Black life.”2  Here, I seek 
to expand on this profound utterance.  The concept is versatile and ironic.  It 
plays on “strict scrutiny” both as a form of legal review, meant to safeguard 
“equal protection under the laws” via the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
logics and function of permissible legal suspicion that allows and comingles 
with what I have titled “Furtive Blackness.”  We can think about “strict 
scrutiny” as both the legally permissible level of suspicion applied to Black 
rights and legal claims to “justice” and equity, that—through the inability of 
Black access to Fourteenth Amendment protections—allows for unbridled 
violence, disenfranchisement and terror manifesting through contact with 
police and white citizens embodying ancestral, deputized policing powers. 
                                                 
 2. American Studies Association Official, Presidential Session: Intersectionality and 
Critical Race Theory, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elaIUgX-
zZE&ab_channel=AmericanStudiesAssociationOfficial. 
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Strict scrutiny acts as a bulwark against the ability of Black harm to be 
legally cognizable and provides a legally permissible logic to “Furtive 
Blackness” as the signifier proving these quotidian contacts necessary and 
renders Black flesh as available for discipline.  Put differently, “strict 
scrutiny” allows for the weakening of Black rights, marking them to be 
presumptively either illegal, or legally incognizable, while “Furtive 
Blackness” describes the ascription of the Black body/person itself as 
always, already suspicious, sly and calling for preemptive discipline.  The 
chronological relationship between the two is unclear.  Perhaps it is because 
the fugitive, furtive Black body conspires to “steal away to freedom”: outside 
of the status of property, coercive servitude, and debt, that its pleas for equity 
and protection under the law are strictly scrutinized both in the courtroom 
and in the classroom.  The strict scrutiny of Black life, as a metaphor, 
attempts to encapsulate the heightened level of legal—both jurisprudential 
and policing—suspicion or review, of Black living that irreparably hinders 
Black access to judicial relief and civil rights.  On the other hand, “Furtive 
Blackness” is concerned with suspicion of Black presence.  In Carbado’s 
estimation, Black people are strictly scrutinized on foot, in our cars, at work, 
at the polls, in our homes and in hospital beds.3  This level of suspicion 
enables a level of hyper visibility and disregard.  To explicate these two 
predicaments, we will turn to the cases of Bakke v. Regents of the University 
of California and Rogers v. American Airlines and the corollary cases of 
Lolade Siyonbolaa and Andrew Johnson.  In the previous article, Furtive 
Blackness: On Blackness and Being, we turned to the cases of BlaQueer 
people like Gemmel Moore and various criminal statutes that target racial-
sexual minorities.  Though we are not explicitly dealing with cases 
concerning BlaQueer life, my position as a BlaQueer person makes these 
concerns central and this essay is a BlaQueer reading of the failures, gaps, 
and horrors of anti-discrimination law and the practice of intramural 
targetability. 
 
II. Defining Strict Scrutiny 
 
In this section, I turn to several stories and a case that illustrate what I 
am calling “the strict scrutiny of Black and BlaQueer life.”  This metaphor 
is meant to communicate the legal and cultural review, as well as the 
surveillance and scrutiny visited upon Black and BlaQueer people.  The 
language is crafted in such a way that it should have clear meaning to legal 
practitioners and scholars, humanities scholars, activists and laypeople alike.  
“Strict scrutiny” is the highest level of judicial review over state action.  It is 
used to ascertain whether a certain law or action is constitutional.  
                                                 
 3. American Studies Association Official, supra note 2. 
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Specifically, it is a level of review applied to legislation and government 
actions—most often when a plaintiff sues the government for 
discrimination—that presupposes those actions are facially unconstitutional.  
When a law or action is subject to strict scrutiny, the government can only 
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality by supplying evidence that 
there is 1) a “compelling state interest” and 2) that the law or action was 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest.4 This level of scrutiny is often 
raised in equal protection claims and, when raised, the law in question must 
have infringed upon a fundamental right or involve a suspect classification. 
Fundamental rights are not only rights conferred by the constitution—
particularly the Bill of Rights—but also those found under the Due Process 
Clause.  These are typically rights so ingrained that they are integral to the 
American experience.  Other rights noted as fundamental—that are not in the 
constitution—include the rights to: privacy5, contraception,6 interstate 
travel,7 marriage,8 procreation,9 custody of one’s children,10 and voting.11 
While largely understood as fundamental—and therefore unchanging—the 
statuses of these rights are not immovable.  For example, in Lochner v. New 
York, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the individual right to contract freely.  However, just 
thirty years later, the Court reversed itself in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 
declaring that: 
 
In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum 
wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract.  
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom 
of contract.  It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law.  In prohibiting that deprivation, 
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable 
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.  
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which 
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.  Liberty under the 
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due 
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject 
and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.12 
                                                 
 4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).   
 5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).   
 6. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).  
 7. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).  
 8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).  
 9. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,684 (1977).  
 10. Meltzer v. C. Buck Lecraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 960 (1971).  
 11. Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006).  
 12. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).  
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Classification of a right as fundamental, as we can see above, is not 
immoveable.  Notions of liberty and due process are malleable and change 
with time and place.  Further, a close reading of the historical moment will 
note the rising tensions between President Franklin Roosevelt—with his eye 
toward a more labor friendly agenda—and the Supreme Court.  It was not 
long after this decision that he announced his famous “court packing” plan.  
In addition, the right to marry is only recently fundamental, as applied to 
non-heterosexual Americans.  On June 26, 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges, a 
combination of four cases challenging bans on same-sex marriage, the Court 
ruled that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
 
III. Defining Suspect Categories 
 
Suspect classifications are the instrument for interpreting invidious 
discrimination. However, the gaps in what are considered suspect 
classifications are also informative.  They tell us who exists outside of legal 
protection and thereby signal targetability.  The language of suspect 
categories lends itself well to the question of who is suspect or who is 
suspicious in the eyes of the law.  The language we have crafted here—the 
metaphor and reality of furtivity—and the question of suspicion—
reasonable, permissible or otherwise—is most prevalent in law in this 
instance.  The large, agreed upon “suspect classifications” are race, religion, 
national origin and alienage.14  Suspect categories are generally categories 
of identity markers, cognizable by law, that have historically been exposed 
to legal and extrajudicial forms of violence, discrimination or exclusion from 
full participation in polity. Specifically, an individual is determined to be 
part of a “suspect classification” or category if they are part of “discrete and 
insular minority.”15  In order to determine whether a person is a discrete and 
insular minority, the court applies a test with a variety of factors.  However, 
it is generally concerned with whether the person is: 1) part of a class that 
has been historically disadvantaged, 2) part of class that has historically 
lacked effective representation or access to the political process, 3) whether 
the person has an inherent or immutable trait and 4) whether that trait is 
highly visible.16  When a statute discriminates against a person based on 
these traits—based on being a “discrete and insular minority” or a member 
of a suspect classification—then the statute is presumed to be 
unconstitutional and is subject to “strict scrutiny.” 
                                                 
 13. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.  
 14. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S., 656, 660 (1973). 
 15. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
 16. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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Missing here, curiously, are sex, gender, and sexuality.  None of these 
identities or communities have yet to be included as “suspect classifications” 
or “insular and discrete minorities.”  However, sex—determined as the sex 
one is assigned at birth due to genitalia and cultural norms—is a “protected 
class.”17  Protected classes are those deemed by Congress or states to be 
protected from retaliatory state or private action or discrimination.  Protected 
classes are not protected via “strict scrutiny” but instead, intermediate 
scrutiny.18  Intermediate scrutiny review is triggered when a statute 
negatively affects a protected class.  To pass muster, the law must further an 
important government interest and do so in a way that is substantially related 
to that interest.19 
Ironically, the protection against sex-based discrimination came from 
discrimination against men.  In Craig v. Boren, an Oklahoma law prohibited 
the sale of “non-intoxicating,” or 3.2% alcohol beer, to women under the age 
of 18 and men under the age of 21.20  Craig Boren, a male in that age range, 
challenged the law and argued that the ban on sales violated his right to equal 
protection under the laws, as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
by establishing different drinking ages for men and women.21  While it is 
ironic that the establishing of gender as a protected class sprouts from an 
apparent curtailing of the rights of white men—to drink alcohol at that—is 
even more ironic when we recall that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
established to ensure the formal, complete citizenship of Black people and 
the formerly enslaved.  This is particularly prescient in the wake of a myriad 
of bombings of churches, police killings of Black citizens and the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, less than a decade earlier.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment had yet to finish its promise of guaranteeing equal 
protection under the law—building upon the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
promise to end the badges and incidents of slavery—yet it somehow found a 
way to create a right for white men to drink without undue burdens. 
 
IV. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke on Strict Scrutiny 
 
It is generally understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments, to grant “equal 
protection under the laws” and “due process” to African descended people 
in the United States.  However, the history of the Reconstruction 
Amendments is fraught and uneven.  They were infamously gutted shortly 
after their adaptation.  The Slaughter-House Cases resulted in a holding that 
                                                 
 17. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).  
 18. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.  
 19. Id. at 524.  
 20. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976). 
 21. Id. at 192.  
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the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to former slaves.  Yet, crucially, the 
Privileges & Immunities Clause only applied to federally held lands.22  The 
promise of the Fourteenth Amendment was further curtailed in the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883, when the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, holding that it was unconstitutional because Congress did not possess 
the power to regulate private activity.23  It is important to note that Civil 
Rights Cases concerned at least five instances where Black people were not 
given equal access to private businesses that performed public goods—such 
as hotels, inns, transportation services and movie theaters—as white 
citizens.24  It further held that Congress exceeded its Thirteenth Amendment 
powers—in an attempt to cure the badges and incidents of slavery—strictly 
reading the amendment as banning slavery, not private racial discrimination 
or acts of subordination.25  This logic was cited and breathed new life in the 
similarly infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, with the Court blessing “separate but 
equal” as the law of the land.26  Black claims to actual citizenship and equal 
protection under the law continued to remain uniquely suspect—if not all out 
assaults on society—until the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 
1968.  Soon after, the Court would again intervene, placing unique burdens 
on Black requests for relief and protection, as evidenced by Bakke.27 
As noted above, Black people constitute a “suspect classification,” as 
we are historically oppressed and distinctly identifiable with immutable 
characteristics (i.e., our flesh).  Therefore, laws and policies that restrict the 
freedoms of—or engage in discrimination against—Black people are subject 
to strict scrutiny.  However, in 1978, the Court began exploring a different 
reading of the use of “strict scrutiny,” as well as the role of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.28  This novel interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
well as strict scrutiny as a standard of review, essentially undid a generation 
of formal precedent.  The law as explicitly articulated through the judiciary: 
in favor of a new modality that strictly scrutinized Black life, particularly 
when attempting to equitably access the laws or gain redress from 
interpersonal and systemic discrimination.  Indeed, Black living—and the 
understanding of the practice of Black life and living as furtive—becomes 
simultaneously legible and illegible for the Court, depending on its needs. 
In particular, the history of anti-Black oppression and oppression 
schema become evidence, not for the need of specific, particularized policies 
or legislation to combat the afterlives of slavery or Jim Crow, but instead as 
                                                 
 22. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 16 (1873). 
 23. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883). 
 24. Stanley, 109 U.S. at 19.  
 25. Id. at 21.  
 26. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).  
 27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 270. 
 28. Id.  
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a new type of precedent: damning policies or legislation that are meant to 
affect one race over another.  Of course, this has the effect of freezing the 
status quo—and at best—creating a floor for and maintaining the current 
material reality of Black (un)citizenship and allowing the costs and fruits of 
whiteness to be born and enjoyed at their current levels of production.  In 
this way, the current value of one’s interest in whiteness as property29, is 
protected by law; in fact, uniquely protected by laws that were meant to 
articulate a complete Black citizenship.  Yet, even in the face of 
reconstruction and intentional formal equality, the power relationship 
between Black and white, slave and master, fugitive and plaintiff, criminal 
and publics, furtive being and citizenship remain intact. 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke the Court ruled in 
favor of Allan Bakke, a white man who had twice been denied admission to 
the University of California at Davis Medical School.30  Bakke argued that 
he was unlawfully discriminated against—in violation of Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—because the school used an affirmative action program that 
included strict racial quotas.31  The school reserved sixteen out of one 
hundred slots for racial minorities.32  To buttress the argument of unlawful 
racial discrimination against him, Bakke offered that the admitted students 
had “significantly low” benchmark scores, including MCAT and GPA 
results.33 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court agreed with Bakke.  It held that race can 
permissibly be used to further school diversity, but only on a case by case 
basis and so long as when race is used, it must be among other factors 
considered for admittance.  The Court held that California had run afoul of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate to refrain from denying “to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” by denying 
white students sixteen out of the one hundred seats solely due to their race.34  
The Court rendered the historical discrimination against Black people as 
wholly irrelevant and instead marked its ruling as race neutral, noting that 
quota systems that preferred one race over the other was “odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”35 
Further, the Court noted, because California’s program had intended to right 
                                                 
 29. Harris, Cheryl I., Whiteness as Property, #? HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); see also UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 06-35, https://ssrn.com/abstract=927850.  Harris shows how 
whiteness evolved from a racial identity into a form of property. She argues that whiteness became 
the basis for racialized privilege and power; from slavery and colonial conquest to the present. 
 30. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278. 
 31. Id. at 279.  
 32. Id. at 289.  
 33. Id. at 277. 
 34. Id. at 289. 
 35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
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past racial discrimination, it had discriminated against “one group for no 
other reason other than race or ethnic origin” and held that the program was 
unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.36  
The Court did, however, note that the state had a “legitimate and substantial 
interest in” eliminating the effects of “identified discrimination.”37  
However, to tend to the remedying of these injuries, the states must engage 
in legislative, administrative or judicial efforts that document and prove 
specific and illegal racial discrimination; a much higher standard than what 
the Court marked as “more focused than the remedying of the effects of 
‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that may be 
ageless in its reach into the past.”38  This had the obvious effect of both 
limiting the formal identification of complex, systemic injuries while also 
marking claims of harm—and appeals to redress—as suspect, in effect, as 
the original sins that necessitated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 
V. Suspicion, Standing, and Malleable Rights 
 
In its review of Bakke, the Court utilizes the Fourteenth Amendment, 
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to not only create a pro-White 
jurisprudence of ceteris paribus, but to weaponize the tool of high judicial 
review to strictly scrutinize both Black life and living, as well as Black 
attempts to use law as a mechanism to ensure formal and social equity.  In 
other words, Black quests for complete and fully realized citizenships are 
suspicious “legal” gestures that are presumed unconstitutional as violations 
of (white people’s) due process and equal protections right.  That is to say, 
the Court has transformed the Fourteenth Amendment into a tool to preserve 
“whiteness as property”39 and Black attempts at fully realized citizenship are 
strictly scrutinized, furtive gestures presumed to run afoul of law and order.  
This is not dissimilar from what Black folks once sang as “stealing away to 
freedom/Jesus.” In the lyrics from the negro spiritual “Steal Away” we not 
only see a desire to attain freedom or citizenship, but the recognition that 
Black freedom then— and perhaps now— is considered a type of theft of 
property and power.  During enslavement, property was unfettered access to 
Black flesh and labor and can be broadly understood as the power to 
subjugate Black people as a matter of law and practice.  In Bakke, the Court 
is not talking about reinstituting slavery but, instead, the logics of the power 
differential that makes manifest the legal difference between Black and 
white, between (un)citizen and citizen.  It attempts to freeze in time—
                                                 
 36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287–320. 
 37. Id. at 307. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Harris, supra note 29. 
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through legal review—a power differential that maintains the central logic 
of slavery.  It does so by rendering Black people as furtive beings—those 
inherently sly, suspect and untrustworthy—and strictly scrutinizing our 
(in)actions as either punishable by law or outside of the law’s realm of 
protection. 
First, the Court accepts and leans into Bakke’s alleged harm.  He was 
twice denied entry to a particular medical school.  In Bakke’s telling—and 
the Courts presumption—he deserved to be admitted (or at least more so than 
the Black and other applicants of color) because his “benchmark” numbers 
were “substantially higher” than those of admitted non-White students.40  To 
the Court, Bakke’s harm and his evidence are legible and logical; not suspect 
or audacious.  Here, the Court supplants the decision-making process of the 
school, and leans into Bakke’s narrative of harm; transforming the facts of 
the case from being about remedying systemic anti-Black oppression to 
being chiefly concerned with Bakke’s white right to equal protection.  In this 
way, the Court creates a scenario in which attempts to remedy past racial 
oppression and discrimination against Black people and other racial 
minorities are strictly scrutinized, and, even then, those same efforts or 
avenues to reparation must be equally accessible to white people.  That is to 
say, to remedy present and past histories of white supremacist privilege, 
terror, and power; one must also be sure that these remedies provide some 
unencumbered pathway to benefit those privileged and empowered by the 
current system of racial power.  To do otherwise renders the law and policies 
in question unconstitutional under the gaze of strict scrutiny, and in the name 
of the “equal protection under the laws,” denies the promise given to the 
newly unenslaved. 
In the Courts decision to supplant the stated goal of the university—as 
well as the harms, rights, and desires of the sixteen admitted students—it 
begins to strictly scrutinize the presence of Black and non-white students by 
casting suspicion on their presence and marking the mechanisms permitting 
their presence as dangerous and outside the law.  They are placed both in and 
outside of law; their presence—or access to educational resources—is 
reviewable by law via its purported effect on Bakke’s rights, yet the systemic 
and interpersonal harms (i.e., racism) that makes this particular pathway for 
their presence necessary are unintelligible to the Court.  Their desires to gain 
a medical education—no different than Mr. Bakke’s—are illegible to the 
Court.  These desires lack standing, meaning they are unable to be seen or 
heard in a court of law.  The court dislodges and discards these desires by 
creating a scenario that posits a “deserving” white male and his hard earned 
rights against an unnamed, unthought racial minority—instead of comparing 
his credentials to those admitted white students—but also by calling for and 
                                                 
 40. Bakke, 438 US at 274. 
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demanding state sponsored proof of racial discrimination that is both 
documented and endorsed by the state government and illegal.  This process 
of disembodying Black people from personhood and standing, in favor of the 
protection of white rights, is not dissimilar from what happened to Margaret 
Ashmore in Prigg v. Pennsylvania; in fact, this is a doubling down on the 
precedent of strictly scrutinizing Black life.41  Margaret Ashmore went from 
being a free citizen of Pennsylvania, wrongly kidnapped and held against her 
will, to a lifeless, fleshy, vessel of property through which the Court 
established the rights of states, the federal government, and individual slave 
owners.42  In that case neither Margaret Ashmore, nor her children, were 
mentioned as parties, instead her kidnapper and those with whom he worked 
were given standing and the gaze of the Court.  In both Bakke and Prigg, 
harms against Black people become recognizable if, and only if, those harms 
can be rerouted into rights and powers for white citizens; or, alternatively, 
when the remedies for those harms can be reformed as bulwarks against 
further eradication of white rights and power under law. 
The Court has inverted the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
deciding Bakke, the Court is not so cavalier as to ignore the realities of 
historical— and certainly not present—racism and discrimination.  To the 
contrary, the Court successfully utilizes the historical and present reality of 
anti-Black racial terrorism and discrimination to create a formal logic of 
universal “non-discrimination.”  The Court does so by using the history of 
anti-Black terrorism and formal discrimination as a cautionary tale of what 
happens when race is taken into account.  The craven, terrorist, 
discriminatory nature of the Black Codes, Jim Crow, and other laws are used 
to foreshadow the dangers of considering Black and non-white races—and 
histories of discrimination—as legally valid.  While some might argue this 
is a type of color-blind jurisprudence, to the contrary, this is jurisprudence 
that functionally freezes current racial power differentials in place.  The 
Court transforms the Fourteenth Amendment from a corrective measure, into 
a preventative one.  Where it was often used to correct and strike down laws 
that maintain or demand the inferior legal status of Black people, it has 
instead become a measure to strike down laws that attempt to create and 
demand racial equity under the law because, in their logic, these laws affect 
and target the rights and privileges of white people.  The history of anti-
Black racial discrimination and terror becomes the logic for anti-Black 
jurisprudence: acknowledging race, namely Blackness, becomes the issue 
because to do so, would require a reworking of how power and citizenship 
are distributed. 
  
                                                 
 41. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 538, 608 (1842). 
 42. Id.  
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VI.  Brief Explanation of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . 
. .  to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
— Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 196443 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broadly prohibits 
discrimination based on categories similar to those prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Specifically, Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination based on color, race, religion, sex and national origin.  
Employers—including governments, colleges and universities, employment 
agencies and labor organizations—with more than 15 employees are bound 
by Title VII.  Discrimination is prohibited in any aspect of employment 
including, but not limited to: hiring and firing; compensation, assignment or 
classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff or recall; job 
advertisements; recruitment; testing; use of company facilities; training and 
apprenticeship programs; fringe benefits; pay, retirement plans and disability 
leave; assertion of rights under Title VII; and other terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Title VII grants the harmed party 180 calendar days from the instance 
of discrimination to file a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  However, if the violation of Title VII is also a 
violation of a law enforced by a state or local agency, then the harmed party 
has 300 days to file a complaint.44 
 
A. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
 
Rogers is jurisprudentially distinct from Bakke because it concerns 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment or its Equal Protection Clause.45  While the courts 
have long acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
various forms of discrimination previously mentioned, it is not often used in 
employment scenarios.  This difference is important and legally substantial, 
because the Fourteenth Amendment addresses state or government action or 
policy, while the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reaches the activity and policies 
of private actors and most Americans are employed by private actors, rather 
                                                 
 43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2.  
 44. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5. 
 45. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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than government agencies.  I bring Bakke and Prigg together to further 
explore the concept of the “strict scrutiny of Black life” and how this 
jurisprudential method of scrutinization and suspicion operates in quotidian 
Black life as a disciplining regime, under the guise of protection, further 
marking Black bodies, Black life and Black movement as inherently outside 
of the protection of law, and, when encountered by law, readily available for 
discipline. 
In Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc, Renee Rogers—an African American 
flight attendant, employed by the company for eleven years—sued for sex 
and racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII, after the company demanded 
that she stopped wearing cornrows and placed her hair in a bun.46  The 
company allegedly based this decision on a change in their employee 
grooming policy.47  Ms. Rogers then sued, arguing that the ban on wearing 
cornrows constituted both sex and racial discrimination.48  The trial court 
dismissed the sex discrimination claims arguing that the claims were 
unfounded because both men and women were banned from wearing 
cornrows.49  Ms. Rogers, in her opposition to a motion to dismiss her racial 
discrimination claim, explains that cornrows are: 
 
Historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black American 
women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of the Black women 
in American society . . .  The style was “popularized” so to speak, 
within the larger society, when Cicely Tyson adopted the same for 
an appearance on nationally viewed Academy Awards presentation 
several years ago . . .  It was and is analogous to the public statement 
by the late Malcolm X regarding the Afro hair style . . .  At the 
bottom line, the completely braided hair style, sometimes referred 
to as corn rows, has been and continues to be part of the cultural and 
historical essence of Black American women . . .  There can be little 
doubt that, if American adopted a policy which foreclosed Black 
women/all women from wearing hair styled as an “Afro/bush,” that 
policy would have very pointedly racial dynamics and consequences 
reflecting a vestige of slavery unwilling to die (that is, a master 
mandate that one wear hair divorced from ones historical and 
cultural perspective and otherwise consistent with the “white 
master” dominated society and preference thereof).50 
 
                                                 
 46. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
 47. Id. at 231. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Brief for Plaintiff in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 4–6, 14–5, 527, Roger, F. Supp. at 232.  
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Predictably, the trial court disagreed with her argument that she was 
being uniquely discriminated against as a Black woman because her hair is 
an “‘easily changed characteristic,’ and even if socioculturally associated 
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for 
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer.”51  
The court goes on to say that: 
 
Moreover, the airline did not require plaintiff to restyle her 
hair. It suggested that she could wear her hair as she liked while off 
duty, and permitted her to pull her hair into a bun and wrap a 
hairpiece around the bun during working hours.  A similar policy 
was approved in Carswell v. Peachford Hospital . . .  Plaintiff has 
done this, but alleges that the hairpiece has caused her severe 
headaches. A larger hairpiece would seem in order.  But even if any 
hairpiece would cause such discomfort, the policy does not offend a 
substantial interest.52 
 
At first brush, Rogers might be read as having little importance, in 
comparison to the weighty Fourth and Thirteenth Amendment arguments 
raised in the previous essay, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment concerns 
raised in Bakke.  However, that would be a grave mistake.  While the Fourth 
Amendment raises serious concerns about state and police encounters, 
contact and engagement with Black bodily integrity, privacy and the logic 
that precedes it, Bakke largely concerns itself with the ability of state, local 
and federal governments to engage in Black conscious reparatory measures.  
Rogers, on the other hand, via the Civil Rights Act of 1964, reaches into the 
private sphere and forces us to reckon with the way the law continues to 
permit or encourage the regulation of the Black body and compromise claims 
to personhood and indeed, equal protection under the law. 
In Rogers, we are not confronted with the activity of police officers or 
furtivity per se, but instead with how Black people are allowed to be present 
and exist in the workplace.  Put differently, this case moves the context of 
subordination on the street, or in one’s car, to the place of employment, 
where one makes their living.  Instead of regulating Black living, the Court 
instead opts to allow for de facto and formal regulation of how that living is 
supported, sustained and made possible.  In Rogers, the Court moves from 
marking her/us merely furtive in nature and instead—at least in this terrain—
opts to strictly scrutinize Black presence and one’s method of being present.  
                                                 
 51. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
 52. Id. at 233. Cf. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding 
no-beard policy despite showing that some Black men had difficulty complying due to racially 
linked skin disease). 
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In other words, this is not dissimilar from the logics that enabled the poll tax.  
The Court would not dare say that Black people are categorically unable to 
vote under the law, but instead narrows the opportunity to do so and creates 
unique burdens for the franchise to be operated.  Therefore, allowing and 
encouraging the poll worker, the election official, and the public at large to 
strictly scrutinize the act of voting and the concept of Black enfranchisement.  
Here, similarly, the Court smartly opts against saying Black women cannot 
work or are unfit to be flight attendants, but strictly scrutinizes how the Black 
woman before it can do such work, on a basis that has no effect on the quality 
of her labor and generally without regard for it.  The concern for the court, 
as well as American Airlines, is not Ms. Rogers performance of employee 
duties—she had been employed for 11 years—but instead on what Thomas 
Jefferson has called “manners,”53 the method of performance, or 
embodiment of servitude, that bends Black appearance, self-styling, and 
personhood to the will and desires of the white gaze.  That Ms. Rogers would 
attempt to assume personhood, if not citizenship, by appearing with hair that 
was not only natural, but styled in a way that celebrates and asserts a level 
of Black individuality—and therefore autonomy—is an affront to embedded 
power dynamics and implied duties.  By styling her hair in a way that 
differentiated her from her white colleagues —making her Black selfhood 
central—Ms. Rogers engaged in a fugitive practice that marked in her flight 
or defiance from centuries of bending to conscripted desires of pleasure and 
being to a white owner, and later a white supremacist gaze. 
There is no doubt—as Kimberle Crenshaw has argued before—that the 
Court’s scrutiny of Ms. Rogers operates on an intersectional axis, namely 
sex and race.  And, as I have argued in other writings, as well as the previous 
article, and explained the notion of “BlaQueerness,” there is no separating 
race, gender and sexuality from each other, even if and when gender is 
fleetingly (un)attainable.  In Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race & Sex, 
Crenshaw analyzes several cases that show the Court marking multiple, 
simultaneous oppressions, or discriminations, as outside of the framework of 
law.  In one case, Mosley v. General Motors, the Court is confronted with 
Black women bringing a claim against General Motors for sex and racial 
discrimination—not dissimilar form this case—where the Court reaches a 
similar conclusion.54  In this case, the women had been previously employed 
as clerks or phone attendants due to a wartime shortage of male labor.  The 
white women who previously held those positions had taken up positions in 
the factory, as the men—both Black and white—had been deployed.  When 
the men returned, the Black women were fired and denied employment as 
both clerks and factory workers.  They sued, arguing they had been 
                                                 
 53. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the state of Virginia, https://www.loc.gov/item/03004902/. 
 54. Mosley v. General Motors, 497 F. Supp. 583, 591 (1980). 
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discriminated against for their race, in the case of clerical jobs, and for their 
gender, in respect to the factory jobs.  The Court denied their claim, 
reasoning that they were both moot because Black men were employed at 
the factory, hence no racial discrimination, and that (white) women were 
employed as clerks, hence no gender discrimination.  Therefore, the 
employer had neither discriminated solely on race nor gender.  The Court 
declined to understand their intersectional argument, in that they faced a 
unique, compounded experience as Black women. 
For Ms. Rogers, the appellate court slightly modified this argument—
as Ms. Rogers did not claim she was being treated differently than Black 
men, or that white women were similarly allowed to wear cornrows—and 
instead held that the claim here was beyond the scope of law, due to her 
“mutable” characteristics.55  That is to say, the company’s regulation of her 
personhood was permissible—and within the protection of the law—because 
there were measures she could take to make the case moot, such as make 
illegible or undetectable her hair. The burden of her hair then, was not the 
company’s to bear.56  It was hers and hers alone.  The Court agreed that she 
would have a strong claim for racial and speech based discrimination if she 
were to have worn an “Afro/Bush” style because of its political association 
and because it was natural.57  While this is true, and perhaps facially “fair,” 
it is nefarious in effect.  In strictly scrutinizing her hair and appearance, the 
Court affirms and mandates a singular natural hairstyle as permissible and 
within lawfulness—while refusing to do the same for white employees—an 
invasion of personhood, privacy, and dignity by fiat.  Further, the Court 
shows little regard—with an acidic humor—for the harm caused by the 
remedy.  In responding to her concern about the damage and pain of folding 
her hair into a bun, the Court encourages her to merely “add a hairpiece.”58  
Finally, in remarking that she is “free” to wear her hair as she feels outside 
of the workplace, the Court again reminds Ms. Rogers of her unfree status 
within the workplace, a “badge” and “incident of slavery” under any serious 
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing the aforementioned.59  
This differs significantly from the work of Kenji Yoshino and his 
theorization of “covering.”60  While Yoshino speaks to problem of muting 
oneself due to racism—particularly its social and cultural pressures—I’m 
speaking to a badge and incidence of slavery which is reenacted as invidious 
discrimination and retaliation against Blackness that is legally protected.61 
                                                 
 55. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.  
 56. Id. at 233.  
 57. Id. at 232. 
 58. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233. 
 59. Id. at 231. 
 60. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, YALE L.J. 111 (2001).  
 61. Yoshino, supra note 60, at 781. 
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VIII.  Precedent as Prologue 
 
Precedence is perhaps the most hallowed concept in law and law 
making.  It allows the citizen, practitioner, and state to craft laws and policies 
that are likely to withstand jurisprudential scrutiny.  Beyond the land of 
lawmaking and policy procuring, however, precedent and judicial rulings—
even those that are nonbinding—signal to the aforementioned groups a 
method, and standard, of regard and disregard.  Law and lawfulness are 
dichotomous to illegality and criminality; signaling what is to be done, 
encouraged and celebrated and what is to be scorned, disciplined and brought 
to heal, all quotidian, necessary community labors and duties of good 
citizenship.  It should come as no surprise then, that jurisprudential decisions 
and logic find themselves mirrored, remade, solidified, and acted out in 
quotidian culture and practices.  For Black people, even those attempting to 
“live otherwise,” law itself becomes an anticipatory manual for how we will 
be (dis)regarded by non-white people, particularly those operating “under 
the cover of law” or, in the case of those like BBQ Becky, those who see 
themselves as the extension, beneficiary or embodiment of the states policing 
power.  Two recent cases make this extremely clear. “I fought to get here,” 
Jean-Louis told CNN in an interview Friday. “I'm not here to qualify my 
existence.  You don't come to the Ivies for that.”62 
On May 11, 2018 Lolade Siyonbola—a Yale African Studies graduate 
student—fell asleep while studying in her dorm’s common room.63  Another 
student, a white woman, Sarah Braasch, later walked in, turned on the lights 
and exclaimed that she was “calling the police.”64 Siyonbola, irritated, then 
went to Braasch’s room, with a camera recording to Facebook Live, to ask 
why she was calling the police. “I have every right to call the police,” 
Braasch said after snapping a photo of Siyonbola.  “You cannot sleep in that 
room.”  “Continue,” Siyonbola said, then taunted her, “Get my good side.”65 
Braasch had already called the police, telling them that “a woman she 
did not know” was sleeping in the common room.66  When the officers 
arrived, they took Lolade aside and repeatedly asked her for identification, 
which she initially resisted stating, “I deserve to be here.  I pay tuition like 
                                                 
 62. Dakin Andone, This Allegedly Wasn't the First Time This White Yale Student Called the 
Cops on a Person of Color, CNN (May 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/11/us/yale-
second-black-student-sarah-braasch/index.html. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Cleave R. Wootson Jr., A Black Yale Student Fell Asleep in Her Dorm’s Common Room. 
A White Student Called Police, WASH. POST (May 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/grade-point/wp/2018/05/10/a-black-yale-student-fell-asleep-in-her-dorms-common-room-a-
white-student-called-police/.  
 66. Andone, supra note 62.  
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everybody else . . . I’m not going to justify my existence here.”67  After she 
relented, showing the officer’s her ID, the officers told her that she was not 
harassed by them and that “every time there’s an interaction with police 
officers doesn’t mean there’s harassment.” She responded, “You have a good 
night. . . I’m not going to have a good night after this.”68  The police 
eventually told Braasch that Lolade was “authorized to be here” and that it 
was not “a police matter.”69 
In the above instance, we witness the quotidian manifestation of the 
jurisprudential strict scrutiny articulated in Bakke.  In that case, the Court 
was suspicious of, and strictly scrutinized the presence of the unnamed Black 
and people of color students.  It was suspicious of, and strictly scrutinized 
their presence, as well as the state’s logic for allowing and creating a 
mechanism for their presence.  When the state positioned the affirmative 
action—or what I would call corrective action—program as one of racial 
redress, the Court was suspicious of not only the ends, but the means and the 
very facts of history that make the case for redress (i.e., mandating state 
studies, various data, legislative and administrative action.)  This facially 
functioned as a burden on the state but in effect, it was a burden of a 
presumption of suspicion—articulated through an inverted theory of strict 
scrutiny—that would legally and socially mark Black presence in colleges 
as always, already curious, suspicious and deserving of inquiry.  The 
corollary to this, of course, is the marking of the presence of white students 
as normative, routine and a phenomenon—if not a privilege—to be 
protected. 
In the scene above, Lolade is doing what most graduate students do: 
fall asleep after a long period of studying and writing.  Her books and papers 
are clearly distributed around her.70  These badges of a typical college student 
should indicate her belonging.  When Braasch sees her, she announced she 
was “calling the police.”  The books and papers indicated nothing, or, were 
subsumed by the presence of a Black person lounging in the lounge.  If 
Lolade’s study materials did nothing to indicate her privilege to be present, 
then her flesh, the color of her skin operated as a fire star alarm noting her 
invasion into a space not meant to her.  The calling of the police, as a first 
response—not unlike that of BBQ Becky beforehand—marks Lolade’s 
transmutation from Yale graduate student to Black trespasser, into a space, 
                                                 
 67. Katherine Mangan, A White Student Called the Police on a Black Student who was 





 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Mangan, supra note 67. 
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a lounge, not meant for entry.  Her crime—not one of actual threats or 
endangerment—was her presence.  Braasch, in her performance of an 
internalized and sociocultural duty to strictly scrutinize Black people—as 
well as her clear marking of Lolade as furtive, even when at rest—appeals to 
the power of the state to discipline and remove Lolade.  
The desire to discipline—and invoke state and personal power—
becomes more evident in her declaration to Lolade that she “cannot sleep 
here,” her invocation of a “right to call the police,” and ominous warning 
“not to get on my bad side.”  Unsaid here, is her prior instance of calling the 
police on Black students on campus for merely being Black and present.  
Lolade is not only being disciplined and chastised for sleeping in the 
common room, but for being present —and resting—without leave or 
permission from Braasch.  In calling the police she exclaims that Lolade is 
“a woman I don’t know.”  This marking of Lolade as furtive and outside of 
the rights given to students is further made clear in her interactions with the 
police.  The police demand, repeatedly, that she produces an ID; while she 
protests and insists on her “right to be here,” specifically noting that she 
“pays tuition like everyone else.”  The mechanism of strict scrutiny, and its 
practice in policing, is clear here.  Lolade’s presence is assumed to be invalid 
until, and unless, she can meet the burden of proof to overcome the 
suspicion—that of the summoned officers and the white hallmate—that 
could very well have her in a life or death situation.  It is important to note 
here that the arrival and decision of the police to engage Lolade is a result of 
their belief in the feelings of Braasch.  Braasch’s fear, annoyance, and 
suspicion is proof enough to marshal police resources to interrogate Lolade’s 
presence, while taking Braasch’s reaction as normal, expected, and beyond 
reasonable investigation.  In this scenario, much like in Bakke, Lolade is 
made to justify her presence, in other words, to make legible to law 
enforcement that presence is “authorized” by overcoming the presumption 
of trespass visited upon her via a legal and cultural practice of strict scrutiny 
of Black presence, bodies, and quotidian life. 
On December 18, 2018 Andrew Johnson, a Black high school wrestler 
in New Jersey, was faced with a level of scrutiny not dissimilar from that of 
Ms. Rogers; he could cut his hair or change his “profession.”71  Just before 
his match began, standing in front of a full auditorium, Johnson was 
informed that he could either have his locs cut immediately or forfeit his 
match (video).72  Forced to choose between upending his wrestling career 
                                                 
 71. Staff Reports, Wrestling Haircut Rule Confusion Prompted Buena to Cancel Match, 
COURIER POST (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.courierpostonline.com/story/sports/high-school/ 
wrestling/2019/01/11/nj-wrestler-haircut-rule-confusion-prompts-buena-regional-cancel-match-
andrew-johnson-alan-maloney/2546251002/. 
 72. Mike Frankel (@MikeFrankleJSZ), TWITTER (Dec 20, 2018 9:54 AM), https://twitter. 
com/MikeFrankelJSZ/status/1075811774954463235. 
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and maintaining his bodily integrity and racial identity, he allowed his hair 
to be cut.73  It was done haphazardly, by a random white female employee, 
with a pair of scissors usually used for arts and crafts.74  In the video, we can 
hear loud sounds from the audience that seem to be a mix between roaring 
applause and shock.75  While there was widespread condemnation after the 
fact—particularly after it had been revealed that the presiding referee had 
referred to a peer as “nigger”—no one moved to intervene in the moment.76 
It made no difference that Johnson had a haircap, that he had been using 
all season, and had attempted to use it.77  Instead, the referee applied and 
interpreted the hair length rule, with the interpersonal equivalence of 
jurisprudential strict scrutiny, policing not only Johnson’s hair—and by 
proxy his Blackness—but also the style of haircap he used.  His review of 
Jackson’s hair acted as a stand-in for his review of Jackson’s presence as a 
whole.  His ability to wrestle—as any public-school student who had made 
the team—was called into question due to the style and length of his hair.  In 
order to wrestle—he would later go on to win—he would not only have to 
pay a social tax of deference and subordination, but he would also pay the 
price of the forfeiture of bodily autonomy and integrity.  The price of entry, 
the price of presence, is understated here because most do not understand the 
hours and years of maintenance to attain locs of that length; nor the time it 
will take to create and maintain a similar hairstyle.  The video shows his locs 
being cut down to the root on the sides, and randomly cut on the top.  In 
order to achieve his initial style again, he will have to surrender his current 
length and wait years for his hair to even out, or purchase extensions and pay 
several hundred dollars for their installation.  Put differently, what was stolen 
here was labor, time, dignity, bodily autonomy, and integrity.  The spectacle, 
one of public and cultural lashing and disciplining, is similar and of the same 
vein of performance as the lynching, public lashing, routine police contact, 
questioning and harassment; a sociolegal politics of discipline, displacement 





In conclusion, I want to meditate on and with the words of Maria 
Grahn-Farley and Anthony Farley. First, Grahn-Farley writes: 
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The law of slavery has not been forgotten by the law of 
segregation; the law of segregation has not been forgotten by the law 
of neosegregation.  The law guarding the gates of slavery, 
segregation, and neosegregation has not forgotten its origin; it 
remembers its father and its grandfather before that.  It knows what 
master it serves; it knows what color to count.78 
 
In this short passage Grahn-Farley argues that the law of slavery has 
not disappeared, despite being formally overturned, and instead operates as 
a type of master precedent.  The law of slavery itself may have passed away 
formally, but its logics, culture, interests, and silent understandings are born 
again—almost as a type of genetic makeup—in the laws of segregation and 
neosegregation, which is the current moment.  The precedent of law and 
lawfulness then, is a precedent and modus operandi to serve White interests 
and count those interests as wholly intelligible and valid under law.  This 
jurisprudential, genetic makeup then provides the backdrop for what this 
chapter is calling the strict scrutiny of Black life.  The term scrutiny comes 
from the word scrutator: 
 
One who examines or investigates or spec. One whose office 
it is to examine or investigate closely, esp. one who acts as an 
examiner of votes at an election, etc.; a scrutineer.79  Whereas 
scrutiny is defined as: Investigation, critical inquiry; an instance of 
this.  Formerly often (now rarely) const. into, †of. 
 
From these two definitions it is clear that scrutiny itself—even when 
outside of the formal legal theater—is an act of extra legal review, to 
determine, via close examination, investigation and critical inquiry, whether 
one’s presence, access to the polity and goods and services is warranted, 
proper and beyond reproach.80  Put differently, strict scrutiny acts as a sort 
of TSA checkpoint for access to the fruits of whiteness as property and/or 
full citizenship.  The law of slavery, the laws of segregation, and the laws of 
neosegregation function as the gatekeepers and formal borderlands that bind 
Black people and Blackness to servitude and subordination while 
simultaneously marking, remarking and regarding whiteness and white 
people as citizens worthy of the birthright of the manners Jefferson speaks 
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of.  These laws mark Black people as both fungible and fugitive; always, 
already slaves on the run or on reprieve, whereas strict scrutiny is the 
mechanism for this branding.  It detects what Spillers has called the 
hieroglyphics of race and reinstitutes, articulates and mandates the politics 
of the plantation in the present.  To attain a modicum of safe passage—
similar to that of the slave pass—the Black body must be made subservient 
and perform the acts of “servitude or bondage for life.”  In Supreme Court 
jurisprudence this looks like remaking oneself in the ocular desires of white 
supremacy, specifically, masking those “immutable characteristics” for safe-
ish “passing.”  The masking functions as a type of “voluntary” transmutation 
that reifies Black people and Blackness as naturally outside of law’s 
protections, while also validating the current racial power structure.  
Whiteness’s supremacy is remade in the quotidian bowing and transmutation 
of Black citizenship to one of servitude; thus, is the cost of “equal protection 
under the law.” 
 
Requests for equality and freedom will always fail. Why? 
Because the fact of need itself means that the request will fail.  The 
request for equality and freedom, for rights, will fail whether the 
request is granted or denied.  The request is produced through an 
injury.  The initial injury is the marking of bodies for less—less 
respect, less land, less freedom, less education, less.  The mark must 
be made on the flesh because that is where we start from. Childhood 
is where we begin and, under conditions of hierarchy, that childhood 
is already marked.  The mark organizes, orients, and differentiates 
our otherwise common flesh.  The mark is race, the mark is gender, 
the mark is class, the mark is.  The mark is all there is to the reality 
of those essences—race, gender, class, and so on—that are said to 
precede existence.  The mark is a system.  Property and law follow 
the mark.  And so it goes.81 
 
In the excerpt above Anthony Farley provides a critical review of the 
law’s inability to provide equality, freedom, and justice.  He argues, not 
dissimilar from Derrick Bell in Racial Realism, that racism (i.e., classism, 
patriarchy, etc.) are not only here to stay but are irreparable by calls and 
requests for equality and freedom.82  Further, he argues, that the fact of harm 
is proof of the failure, regardless of whether requests for redress are heeded 
or denied.  This is because these failures are not mere failures of law, but 
markings of law and culture.  Like Spillers, Farley points to these structural 
and interpersonal harms as markings on the flesh; brandings that are seared 
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and recalled upon sight.  This marking, branding, hieroglyph “organizes, 
orients and differentiates.”  In his estimation, law is incapable of remedy 
because law is a precedent of a system of othering, dehumanizing, and 
flagging for hierarchy and natural proximity to social death.  These markings 
signal the marked excess to humanity and to citizenship, not as part and 
parcel of the commons.  The mark itself may be inarticulable, because it 
predates what is considered necessary to be said and remarked upon.  
Property and law maintain these marks via metalanguages of race, class, sex 
etc. but cannot undo them because their purpose to maintain the precedence 
of their existence.  Put differently, law cannot undo its own very foundations, 
its central logic is respect for precedence, for the nature of property and both 
the nature of property and the function of precedence is to maintain what was 
before. 
This precedence, regardless of seemingly progressive intervention, 
mandates the strict scrutinization of Black life and presence; Black furtivity 
is baked into it.  It is a central feature of law, as a part of its genetic makeup.  
Therefore, all laws, even those seen as most “pro-Black” contain a preceding 
logic of Blackness as less, as other, and as a slave to a master.  Strict scrutiny 
then, is the mechanism of maintenance.  It narrows the reach of Blackness as 
inside of law and lawfulness—access to certain protections and curtailing of 
certain violence—while simultaneously expanding the methods by which 
Black people can be rendered outside of law (“non-immutable 
characteristics,” furtive gestures,  insurmountable burdens of proof and 
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